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The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to struggle to contain the costs of its weapons 
programs. In fact, there are indications that over the past few years, cost growth has actually 
increased. In 2003, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the costs of major 
development acquisition programs (MDAPs) exceeded initial estimates by a combined total of 
$186 billion. By 2007, this figure increased to $302 billion, and by 2011, MDAPs exceeded their 
initial estimates by $402 billion (GAO, 2011). Moreover, the cost of DoD programs in absolute 
terms has also increased.  
In its recent effort to reduce the costs of military acquisitions, the Obama administration 
mandated that the DoD increase the use of fixed-price contracts. However, the enduring problem 
of increasing costs suggests multiple, systemic failures occurring within the acquisition process. 
Unfortunately, the tendency to promote simplistic (and often ineffective) remedies over 
substantive reform often guides policy decisions. The fact is that the DoD already spends the vast 
majority of its acquisition funds on fixed-price contracts for specified quantities of products, 
usually with good results: quality products are furnished to the DoD at agreed-upon prices. When 
it comes to major development programs, there may be a good reason that the DoD has come to 
rely more on cost-reimbursement (as opposed to fixed-price) contracts. 
 
Unlike other DoD programs, MDAPs are often associated with a high level of uncertainty. This 
uncertainty may stem from a variety of sources, including the use of immature technologies or 
budgetary challenges or the need to make changes as the design matures. Cost-reimbursement 
contracts are more appropriate when there are system performance uncertainties or when there is 
a likelihood that changes will be required, making it difficult to project accurate cost estimates 
with sufficient accuracy to allow for fixed-price contracts.  
 
Because many of the DoD’s systems are technologically advanced, complex, and, in some cases, 
unprecedented (i.e., there are no prior examples on which to base development), requirements, 
quality dimensions, and performance specifications often evolve over time. As one might expect, 
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it can also be difficult to verify whether or not the contractor has fulfilled its obligations, given 
the lack of detailed specifications contained in the contract. In short, incomplete information 
results in higher risk.  
 
In its effort to control cost growth, the DoD periodically embraces fixed-price contracts in order 
to shift more of the responsibility and risk to the contractor. In the 1950s, the DoD’s heavy use of 
cost-reimbursement contracts resulted in significant cost growth, which led to the introduction of 
total package procurement (TPP), a strategy under which single, fixed-price contracts were used 
to cover research, development, production, and, often, support. TPP was conceived by the Air 
Force in the 1960s. Under TPP, “all anticipated development, production, and as much support 
as is feasible of a system throughout its anticipated life is to be procured as one total package and 
incorporated into one contract containing price and performance commitments at the outset of 
the acquisition phase of a system procurement” (Logistics Management Institute, 1967, p. 3). 
However, inaccurate cost estimates, which were often based on uncertainties introduced by 
overly optimistic technology assessments, led contractors to chronically underbid. In 1988, 
Congress reacted to the issue, passing Section 8118 of the Defense Appropriations Act, which 
prohibited the DoD from awarding fixed-price contracts in excess of $10 million for 
development of major systems or subsystems. 
 
The early 2000s saw continued support for cost-reimbursement contracts. The Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS, 2012) restricted the DoD’s use of fixed-price 
contracts for development programs by adding two conditions: (1) the level of program risk 
permits realistic pricing and (2) the use of a fixed-price contract permits an equitable and 
sensible allocation of program risk between the government and the contractor. The DFARS also 
states that for development efforts, cost-reimbursement contracts are preferred. 
Agency theory, transaction cost theory (TCT), and incomplete contract theory provide a basis for 
understanding the advantages and disadvantages of cost-reimbursement and fixed-price contracts 
from the perspective of the contractor and the customer. According to agency theory, whenever 
one party (principal) depends on the action of another (agent) in a particular domain, a principal–
agent relationship arises. It can be difficult to ensure that the agent acts effectively on behalf of 
vi 
 
the principal because (1) there is an inherent difference in the principal’s and agent’s interests 
(value conflict) and (2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the agent’s actions; 
as a result, the agent may have more insight into the real state of the work (information 
asymmetry). To benefit from the terms of a contract, the DoD’s personnel must have access to all 
of the required information when negotiating contracts with outside providers; however, when it 
comes to the long-term development of major systems, this is commonly not the case. 
Consequently, the use of a fixed-price contract is generally not appropriate.  
If agency theory argues against the use of fixed-price development contracts, TCT suggests that 
there are potential benefits associated with this contract type. A transaction cost is “any activity 
which is engaged in to satisfy each party to an exchange that the value given and received is in 
accord with his or her expectations” (Ouchi, 1980, p. 130). TCT asserts that transactions between 
individuals (or organizations) are not cost free. By using fixed-price contracts, the DoD can 
eliminate some of the transaction costs normally incurred after the contract is awarded. For 
example, under a cost-reimbursement contract arrangement, the DoD must determine what 
constitutes an allowable expense. Under a fixed-price contract, the costs associated with making 
such a determination are eliminated. However, this advantage is less apparent if numerous 
changes are made to the fixed-price contract (since each change creates an additional 
transaction). As previously stated, weapons programs are often initiated with incomplete 
information, and there are generally many changes driven by evolving technology and 
requirements.  
Creating a contract that is truly comprehensive is unrealistic; that is, few contracts can precisely 
define each party’s obligations in all potential scenarios that may arise. Even when it is possible 
to do so, the transaction costs involved often make it impractical. Broadly speaking, incomplete 
contract theory generally does not support the use of fixed-price contracts for weapons system 
development programs. Because initial performance requirements are often unstable, the 
ambiguity in the contract may enable the contractor to technically meet a requirement according 
to the letter of the contract (or its interpretation of the contract) but fail to meet its intent as 
envisioned by the DoD. In addition, because programs usually take between 10 and 20 years to 
develop, programs may undergo significant change as a result of emerging technology.    
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In this report, we examine three DoD aircraft acquisitions that relied on fixed-price contracts to 
highlight the various risks associated with fixed-price contracting. First, we examine the C-5 
Galaxy.  
 
In an effort to incentivize contractors to minimize program costs, Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara introduced TPP in the mid-1960s to acquire the C-5, one of the largest military 
aircraft ever produced. As its name suggests, TPP incorporates into a single contract all 
development and production (and, often, support) costs. In addition, the contract would include 
precise price and performance expectations. The C-5 contract was negotiated, using this strategy, 
with a fixed-price-plus-incentive contract. Lockheed submitted the lowest bid of $1.9 billion and 
was eventually awarded the contract. In 1968, the Air Force projected that the program might 
exceed initial estimates by more than $2 billion. Moreover, there is some indication that the Air 
Force may have attempted to conceal the overruns from Congress. In late 1968, the Air Force 
realized that Lockheed was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1969, realizing that it would have 
little recourse should Lockheed’s situation worsen, the Air Force took delivery of the first C-5A, 
leaving many of the acknowledged deficiencies unresolved. In 1971, the Air Force replaced the 
existing contract with a cost-minus-fixed-fee contract, under the condition that Lockheed absorb 
a $200 million loss, which was more than half of the firm’s net worth.  
Next, we examine the F-111, a multipurpose tactical fighter-bomber capable of supersonic 
speeds. By the late 1950s, both the Air Force and the Navy were considering replacing a number 
of their ageing fighters. Although their needs differed considerably, Secretary McNamara 
insisted that the Navy and Air Force work together to develop joint requirements to the extent 
possible. In November 1962, a fixed-price-incentive-contract was awarded to General Dynamics. 
However, despite Secretary McNamara’s proclamation that the development and production of a 
common aircraft would save as much as a billion dollars, costs increased dramatically over the 
duration of the program. The early development of the F-111 proved problematic and costly.  By 
1972, the development cost estimate more than tripled, to $1.675 billion, while the production 
estimate increased by more than $3 billion, to $5.334 billion. The first flight of the F-111A took 
place in December 1964, and the first production models were delivered to the Air Force in 
1967. Meanwhile, the F-111B was canceled because it was not meeting the Navy’s expectations.  
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Lastly, we examine the A-12 Avenger II. The objective of this program was to incorporate 
advanced stealth technology into the development of medium-attack aircraft with long ranges, 
high payloads, and a very low visibility profile. The Navy initially planned to buy 620 A-12s, 
and the Marine Corps planned to purchase an additional 238 planes. The Air Force also 
considered buying 400 A-12s. In January 1988, a team consisting of General Dynamics and 
McDonnell Douglas personnel was awarded a full-scale, fixed-price-incentive-contract, with a 
target price of $4.38 billion. From the beginning, the development process was troubled by a 
series of significant technical and engineering problems. In the early 1990s, as the development 
process evolved, the contractor team, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics, admitted that 
the project faced serious engineering problems and that some performance expectations could 
not be met. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney directed the Navy secretary “to show cause” by 
January 4, 1991, as to why the DoD should not terminate the program (Congressional Research 
Service [CRS], 1991). The Navy, in turn, required that the contractors respond to Secretary 
Cheney’s demand and notified them that the contract might be terminated unless satisfactory 
conditions were obtained by January 2, 1991. The contractor team submitted a new certified 
program claim, requesting a $1.4 billion increase in the target price, and stated that they could 
not meet the technical specifications and deliver the aircrafts in accordance with the terms of the 
original contract.  In January 1991, Secretary Cheney directed the Navy to terminate the A-12 
program.  
Based on the theoretical considerations and the examples presented in this report, we believe that 
fixed-price contracts are not well-suited to major weapons system development programs. This is 
not to say that, as a rule, fixed-price contracts should never be used in development programs but 
that their use will not correct, or compensate for, systemic defense acquisition challenges (e.g., 
inaccurate cost estimates, over-optimism, lack of technical knowledge). Flexibility with regard to 
costs, schedule, and performance should be built into a contract so that trade-offs can be made as 
development progresses. Cost-reimbursement contracts are more appropriate in this regard. Yet, 
at this moment, fixed-price contracts are being used to acquire MDAPs throughout the DoD.  
 
As the U.S. economy, still reeling from the recession of 2008, continues along the path to 
recovery, lawmakers are searching for ways to cut spending in order to reduce the country’s $16 
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trillion debt. The DoD, which consumes the second largest portion of government revenue after 
entitlements, will likely see significant cuts in coming years. In light of these budgetary 
constraints and widespread security challenges, the DoD will need to rethink how it uses its 
dwindling resources; in simple terms, it must be able to do more with less. What worked in the 
past may not work in the coming years. The DoD must initiate bold reforms to bring increasing 
costs under control. In the grand scheme of things, the back and forth over contract type is a 







The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to struggle to contain the costs of its 
weapons programs. Yet, the underlying causes of cost growth—over-optimism, 
estimating errors, unrecognized technical issues, requirements creep, and budget, 
quantity, and schedule changes—have been understood and elaborated on for decades. In 
1982, an unnamed witness at a House Armed Services Committee meeting declared that 
“Enough material has been written on the subject of cost growth during the past 10 years 
to fill a Minuteman silo”1 (Calcutt, 1993, p. 1). Thirty years later, the causes and 
magnitude of program cost overruns remain relatively unchanged—as confirmed by three 
or four more silos worth of studies and analyses.  
 
A 2006 Rand report analyzed selected acquisition reports (SARs) on 46 completed 
weapons systems programs over the course of three decades, between 1970 and 2000 
(Arena, Leonard, Murray, & Younossi, 2006). The study compared the costs at major 
acquisition decision milestones (MS) with initial cost estimates. It found that the average 
adjusted total cost for a completed program grew (i.e., exceeded the initial estimate) by 
46% between the system development and demo milestone decision (MS B) and the 
production and deployment milestone decision (MS C). The report then examined the 
extent of cost growth by decade and concluded that among completed and ongoing 
programs, each decade saw similar increases in development costs.  
 
In fact, there are indications that over the past few years, overall program cost growth has 
actually increased. Periodically, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) analyzes 
cost growth occurring within the DoD’s major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs).2 
In 2003, the GAO found that program costs exceeded initial estimates by a combined 
                                     
 
1 A Minuteman silo is approximately 10 ft. wide and 70 ft. deep. 
2 An MDAP is an acquisition program that requires an eventual total expenditure for research, 
development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of more than $365 million in fiscal year (FY) 2000 constant 
dollars or more than $2.190 billion in procurement in FY2000 constant dollars (Major Defense Acquisition 
Program Defined, § 2430). 
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total of $186 billion. By 2007, this figure increased to $302 billion, and by 2011, MDAPs 
exceeded their initial estimates by $402 billion3 (GAO, 2009a; GAO, 2011). 
 
Perhaps an even greater challenge is that the unit cost of DoD programs in absolute terms 
has also increased rapidly. For example, the unit cost of high-performance aircraft 
programs has grown at an exponential rate over time (see Figure 1). In 1984, Norman 
Augustine made an intriguing, if not alarming, prediction: 
 
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will purchase just one aircraft. This 
aircraft will have to be shared by the Air Force and Navy 3½ days each per week 
except for leap year, when it will be made available to the Marines for the extra 
day. (p. 12)  
 
 
Figure 1. Augustine’s 16th Law 
(“Defence Spending In A Time Of Austerity,” 2010). 
 
Recent estimates put the total cost (i.e., production, operations, and support costs in then-
year dollars) of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter at $1.5 trillion, making it one of the most 
costly DoD programs in history. 
 
                                     
 
3 Figures are in 2010 constant dollars. 
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Despite decades of attempted reforms, the DoD has struggled to acquire weapon systems 
at reasonable cost. The Obama administration, for its part, has pointed to the DoD’s 
increased reliance on contractors as a source of cost growth. Indeed, the DoD has steadily 
increased contractor spending over the past decade, from just under $150 billion in 2000 
to approximately $400 billion in 2008 (Weigelt, 2012). In 2009, the Obama 
administration mandated that the DoD increase the use of fixed-price contracts in order to 
reduce the costs of military acquisitions. At first glance, the rationale seems obvious: the 
use of fixed-price contracts reduces costs by ensuring that the DoD pays its contractors 
no more than the agreed-upon price.  
 
However, the historic problem of increasing costs suggests multiple, systemic failures 
occuring within the acquisition process (including frequent program changes introduced 
by both the DoD and Congress). Moreover, the growing technical complexity of projects 
can make managing cost growth more challenging. Recent surveys indicate that the cost 
of complex, commercial-sector “megaprojects” increases by an average of 30% over 
initial estimates (Flaherty, 2012). Unfortunately, the tendency to promote simplistic (and 
often ineffective) remedies over substantive reform often guides policy decisions. The 
DoD already spends the vast majority of its acquisition funds on fixed-price production 
contracts for specified quantities of products, usually with good results: quality products 
are furnished to the DoD at agreed-upon prices. In other words, there may be a good 
reason that the DoD has come to rely more on cost-reimbursement (as opposed to fixed-
price) contracts for MDAP research and development. 
 
Report Road Map 
This report adopts a historical perspective to analyze the effectiveness of fixed-price 
contracts in acquiring MDAPs. We begin with a brief survey of the different contract 
types employed by the DoD, describing their basic characteristics. Second, we examine 
the theoretical basis for the various contract types as well as the contexts within which 
they can provide the most benefit to the parties involved. In Section IV, we examine three 
DoD aircraft acquisitions that relied on fixed-price contracts: the C-5 Galaxy, the F-111 
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Aardvark, and the A-12 Avenger II. We also provide a brief overview of the F-117 
Nighthawk program, which used a cost-reimbursement contract during the development 
phase. In Section V, we present the lessons learned and discuss some of the common 
challenges associated with fixed-price contracting. Also in Section V, we offer our 





In general, contracts vary across two important dimensions: (1) the degree and timing of 
the responsibility assumed by the contractor for the costs of program performance and (2) 
the amount and nature of the incentive offered to the contractor for achieving or 
exceeding specified standards or goals. The DoD typically relies on two contract types to 
acquire weapons systems: fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1. Fixed-Price and Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
(GAO, 2009b) 
 
Fixed-price contracts specify the amount that the contractor will receive for fulfilling the 
terms of the contract. The price the government pays will only change if the contract 
itself is revised. This type of contract shifts most of the risk to the contractors, since they 
assume the responsibility for all costs and the resulting profit or loss. It also provides the 
greatest incentive for the contractor to perform effectively while maximizing their profits 
(by controlling their costs). Moreover, these contracts reduce the administrative burden 
on both contracting parties. In general, fixed-price contracts should be used “when the 




Fixed-price Pays fixed price even if actual total 
cost of product exceeds the contract 
price. May also pay an award or 
incentive fee related to performance. 
Provides an acceptable 
deliverable at the time, 
place, and price 





Pays contractor’s allowable costs 
incurred, to the extent prescribed by 
the contract. Also may pay a fee, 
which may be related to 
performance. Contracts include an 
estimated total cost for purposes of 
obligating funds and a ceiling that 
the contractor exceeds at its own risk 
(unless approved by the contracting 
officer). Government is not 
guaranteed a completed end item or 
service within the estimated cost.  
Makes good faith 
effort to meet 
government’s needs 





risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an accepted degree of certainty” (FAR 
16.202). In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts provide for payment of allowable 
incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract up to a predetermined cost ceiling 
(FAR 16.301). Under this type of contract, the contractor has minimal responsibility for 
the performance costs. By their nature, cost-reimbursement contracts have a higher 
administrative burden because the contractor must have a compliant cost accounting 
system and costs must be audited by the government to ensure their validity. 
Both of these contract types can be combined with incentives and fees to create a variety 
of different incentive structures. For example, fixed-price incentive contracts can include 
a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit ceiling or floor), and a profit 
adjustment formula. They can also include sharing formulas, which reward contractors 
with a percentage of the savings if they are able to deliver the final product below the 
agreed-upon target price. On the cost-reimbursement side, a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract 
pays contractors for all of its allowable incurred expenses plus additional payment in the 
form of profit, but these contracts can also be structured with incentives and/or award 
fees.   
Each contract type provides a different combination of performance and risk to the 
government. The objective of selecting an appropriate contract type is to reasonably and 
fairly allocate the risk between the government and the contractor while providing an 
incentive to the contractor for efficient and economical performance.   
 
Choosing the appropriate contract type to acquire MDAPs can be challenging. Unlike 
other DoD programs, MDAPs are often associated with a high level of uncertainty. Peck 
and Scherer (1962) distinguish between two types of uncertainty: internal and external. 
Internal uncertainty may stem from a variety of sources, including the use of immature 
technologies or the need to make changes as the design matures. Generally, the DoD 





 Economic  
Projected price growth changes.  
 Quantity  
Adjustments are made to the quantity of units procured. 
 Schedule  
Delivery schedules, production completion dates, or production milestones are 
revised. 
 Engineering  
Physical or functional characteristics of the program are altered to meet changing 
requirements. 
 Estimating  
Errors in preparing the original estimate are corrected, previous estimates are 
refined, or cost-estimating assumptions change. 
 Support 
The type or extent of training, including the training equipment, is updated to 
reflect changing requirements or mission needs. 
 
External uncertainty, on the other hand, “involves changes in the demand for a weapon 
due to changes in the external threat, changes in the availability of substitute weapons, or 
simply changes in Congress’s willingness to purchase certain weapons” (Rogerson, 1994,  
p. 67).  Cost-reimbursement contracts are best suited when there are high levels of 
internal and external uncertainty.  
 
Because many of the DoD’s systems are technologically complex and, in some cases, 
unprecedented (i.e., there are no prior examples on which to base development), 
requirements, technology, quality dimensions, and performance specifications often 
evolve over time. Indeed, the GAO (2010) has concluded that most weapons programs 
proceed with limited knowledge on technology, design, and manufacturing in the 
acquisition process. As one might expect, it can also be difficult to verify whether or not 
the contractor has fulfilled its obligations, given the necessarily broad language contained 
in the contract. In short, incomplete information results in higher risk. When making 
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contractual arrangements, the high uncertainty and complexity associated with MDAPs 
should be taken into account. 
 
Components of the Fixed-Price Contract 
“Firm” fixed-price contracts are rarely used in conjunction with major development 
programs. Rather, many DoD programs are governed by fixed-price-incentive contracts.  
According to the FAR, a fixed-price incentive contract provides for adjusting profit and 
establishes the final contract price “by application of a formula based on the relationship 
of total final negotiated cost to total target cost” (FAR 16.403). The final price is subject 
to a price ceiling, negotiated at the outset.  The typical components of this type of 
contract are described as follows. 
 Target Cost  
The initially negotiated figure for estimated contract costs and the point at which 
profit pivots. 
 Target Profit  
The initially negotiated profit at the target cost. 
 Target Price 
The target cost plus the target profit. 
 Ceiling Price  
Stated as a percentage of the target cost. This is the maximum price the 
government expects to pay. Once this amount is reached, the contractor pays all 
remaining costs for the original work. 
 Share Ratio   
The government/contractor sharing ratio for cost savings or cost overruns that will 
increase or decrease the actual profit. The government percentage is listed first, 
and the terms used are “government share” and “contractor share.” For example, 






 Point of Total Assumption (PTA) 
The point at which cost increases that exceed the target cost are no longer shared 
by the government, according to the share ratio. At this point, the contractor’s 
profit is reduced one dollar for every additional dollar of cost. (Antonio, 2003). 
 
A Brief History 
Contracting for weapons systems can be characterized by a series of pendulum swings.  
At different points throughout history, DoD initiatives have promoted fixed-price 
contracts, sometimes to the exclusion of cost-reimbursement contracts, and vice versa. 
For example, in the 1950s, the DoD’s heavy use of cost-reimbursement contracts resulted 
in significant cost growth, which led to the introduction of total package procurement 
(TPP), a strategy under which single fixed-price contracts were used to cover research, 
development, production, and support. TPP was conceived by the Air Force in the 1960s. 
Under TPP, “all anticipated development, production, and as much support as is feasible 
of a system throughout its anticipated life is to be procured as one total package and 
incorporated into one contract containing price and performance commitments at the 
outset of the acquisition phase of a system procurement” (Logistics Management 
Institute, 1967, p. 3). However, inaccurate cost estimates, based on overly optimistic 
technology assessments, led contractors to chronically underbid.  
 
Contrary to popular belief, the contractor is not the only one to lose out in such situations. 
Often, by the time cost overruns are detected, the government has already invested large 
amounts in the program. If continued performance under a fixed-price contract drives the 
contractor to the verge of bankruptcy—which actually occurred twice during the 1970s—
then the government risks having nothing to show for its investment. Moreover, given the 
significant defense industry consolidation that has occurred over the last few decades, 
reductions in the number of contractors could negatively impact competition among the 
remaining firms and jeopardize the overall health of the industry. In July 1971, the DoD 
changed its policy, asserting that 
It is not possible to determine the precise production cost of a new complex defense 
system before it is developed; therefore, such systems will not be procured using the total 
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package procurement concept, or production options that are contractually priced in the 
development contract.  Cost-type prime and subcontracts are preferred where substantial 
development effort is involved. (Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, 1975). 
In 1988, Congress went further, passing Section 8118 of the Defense Appropriations Act, 
which prohibited the DoD from awarding fixed-price contracts in excess of $10 million 
for development of major systems or subsystems “unless the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition determines, in writing, that program risk has been reduced to the extent 
that realistic pricing can occur, and that the contract type permits an equitable adjustment 
and sensible allocation of program risk between the contracting parties” (Defense 
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988). 
The early 2000s saw continued support for cost-reimbursement contracts. The Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS, 2012) requires that the DoD avoid 
fixed-price contracts for development programs unless (1) the level of program risk 
permits realistic pricing and (2) the use of a fixed-price type contract permits an equitable 
and sensible allocation of program risk between the government and the contractor. The 
DFARS also clearly states that “for development efforts, particularly for major defense 
systems, the preferred contract type is cost reimbursement.” 
In recent years, the DoD has used cost-reimbursement contracts more than any other 
department. According to the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), in 2008, cost-
reimbursement contracts for defense systems and research amounted to $17.5 billion. 
Because cost-reimbursement contracts generally include an award or incentive fee for the 
contractor based on its performance (i.e., delivering the product below the target cost), 
some government leaders have criticized the increasing use of this type of contract, 
asserting that it is a key contributing factor to large and frequent cost overruns. In its 
review of 92 federal government contracts, the GAO (2009b) concluded that cost-
reimbursement contracts are often used without appropriate justification or sufficient 
government oversight. This criticism is not without merit; however, without incentive 
fees, there is often no other mechanism in place to encourage the contractor to prioritize 
cost efficiency in the development and delivery of the product. In fact, contractors face 
perverse incentives, such as placing low initial bids, to “get their foot in the door”; then, 
11 
 
once the contract is awarded, and costs increase, the government has little to no recourse. 
This is especially true if the cost increase is attributable to changes that the winning 
contractor has priced on a monopoly basis.  
The Obama administration, for its part, believes that cost-reimbursement contracts are a 
major source of program cost growth.  In 2009, the Obama administration launched a 
government contracting reform initiative. In a March 4 memorandum, President Obama 
(2009) asserted that excessive reliance by the federal agencies on cost-reimbursement 
contracts “creates a risk that taxpayer funds will be spent on contracts that are wasteful, 
inefficient, subject to misuse, or otherwise not well designed to serve the needs of the 
Federal Government or the interests of the American taxpayer” (p. 1) He also restated 
federal government policy: that “there shall be a preference for fixed-price type 
contracts” and that “cost-reimbursement contracts shall be used only when circumstances 
do not allow the agency to define its requirements sufficiently to allow for a fixed-price 
type contract” (p. 1) He also directed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to 
provide guidance to improve the acquisition process. 
In response to the president’s request, the OMB required federal agencies to reduce their 
dollar share of cost-reimbursement and other high-risk contracts by 10% (Orszag, 2009). 
These actions aimed to maximize incentives for successful contract performance. 
Combined with other initiatives to reduce reliance on contractors (e.g., “insourcing” 
previously contracted-out positions), overall federal contract spending declined for the 
first time since 1997. In the first half of 2010, the percentage of dollars awarded in new 




III. Theoretical Basis 
 
Agency theory, transaction cost theory (TCT), and incomplete contract theory provide a 
basis for understanding the advantages and disadvantages of cost-reimbursement and 
fixed-price contracts from the perspective of the contractor and the customer. We 
examine each of these theories in the following sections.   
Agency Theory 
Whenever one party (principal) depends on the action of another (agent) in a particular 
domain, a principal–agent relationship arises. With regard to contracting, this relationship 
is formed whenever one firm (the principal) hires another (the agent) to perform a service 
and then delegates some amount of decision-making authority to the agent. According to 
agency theory, it can be difficult to ensure that the agent acts effectively on behalf of the 
principal because (1) there is an inherent difference in the principal’s and agent’s 
interests (value conflict) and (2) it is difficult or expensive for the principal to monitor the 
agent’s actions; as a result, the agent may have more insight into the real state of the work 
(information asymmetry).  
The contract is the mechanism that governs the principle–agent relationship. Because the 
two parties do not share the same interests and values, agents may work below their 
capacity and even harm the principal’s interest (moral hazard problem), even if the 
contract is specific and covers multiple contingencies. Agency theory focuses on 
developing an efficient contract to govern this relationship by overcoming the 
organizational differences in self-interest, risk aversion, and information asymmetry 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ross, 1973). 
Agency theory suggests that contracts can be structured so as to induce agents to serve 
the principal’s interest; however, this entails higher agency costs, including the costs of 
investigating and selecting appropriate agents, gaining information to set standards, 
monitoring agents, bonding payments by agents, and taking on residual losses. In 
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addition to establishing the initial contract, minimizing these costs also presents a 
challenge.   
Outcome-based contracts that align the interests of the agent with those of the principal 
can be effective in reducing the conflict of self-interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, 
the DoD’s increasing reliance on performance-based logistics (PBL) contracts is 
supported by agency theory. With PBL, the DoD contracts for outcomes, i.e., the 
contractor offers long-term support and maintenance services to achieve specified 
outcomes. Rather than purchasing individual support services (e.g., parts, repairs, 
engineering) via multiple, separate transactions, PBL strives for specific outcomes (such 
as the seamless availability of functioning weapons systems, communication devices, or 
vehicles). By incentivizing the contractor to achieve the required outcomes, the DoD 
objectives are aligned with those of the contractor.  As a result, the contractor will be 
motivated to improve the reliability and durability of the supported system.   
When it comes to selecting the contract type for a weapons system acquisition, agency 
theory helps to illuminate the challenges. With government contracting, there is a 
mismatch of interests and information. The DoD objective is national security while the 
contractors seek to maximize their profits. These differences in interests create the 
potential for an agency problem. The most critical issue is the flow of information: the 
DoD’s personnel must have access to all of the required information when negotiating 
contracts with outside providers; however, when it comes to the long-term development 
of major systems, this is commonly not the case. Consequently, the use of a fixed-price 
contract, which should be used for low-risk acquisitions, is generally not appropriate.  
Transaction Cost Theory 
If agency theory argues against the use of fixed-price development contracts, TCT 
suggests that there are potential benefits associated with this contract type. A transaction 
cost is “any activity which is engaged in to satisfy each party to an exchange that the 
value given and received is in accord with his or her expectations” (Ouchi, 1980, p. 130). 
TCT asserts that transactions between individuals (or organizations) are not cost free. In 
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other words, there is a cost associated with participating in the market (i.e., making an 
economic exchange) beyond that which is reflected in the price of a good or service. This 
could be in the form of paying a commission when buying or selling a stock. TCT can 
also be applied with regard to everyday purchases. For instance, in deciding which winter 
coat to buy, one often compares prices at multiple retail outlets, expending time and 
energy in the process. In addition to these opportunity costs, the cost of traveling to 
different outlets is not insignificant. One might categorize these as “search and 
information costs,” but other types of transaction costs, although less obvious, occur 
regularly in economic exchanges. Within the context of contracting, these costs include 
(1) the bargaining costs required to come to an agreement acceptable to both parties and 
(2) enforcement costs, which the customer pays to ensure that the contractor is meeting 
its obligations. 
TCT has been widely used to analyze organizational behaviors, including government 
acquisition and contracting arrangements. Governments are growing increasingly aware 
of the importance of examining the transaction costs of certain activities in different 
contexts so that they can design governance mechanisms to minimize them. With regard 
to government contracting, because of the difference in organizational goals and interests, 
along with the inherent information asymmetry between contractor and buyer, contract 
negotiation and implementation are not cost free. In fact, the transaction cost of managing 
the relationship between government buyers and contractors from the bidding process to 
contract termination can be significant. Arranging the bidding process, initiating requests 
for proposals, negotiating with potential bidders, selecting potential contractors, and 
enforcing the terms of the contract all incur transaction costs. By using fixed-price 
contracts, the DoD can eliminate some of the transaction costs normally incurred after the 
contract is awarded. For example, under a cost-reimbursement contract arrangement, the 
DoD must determine what constitutes an allowable expense. Under a fixed-price contract, 
the costs associated with making such a determination are eliminated.  
However, this advantage is less apparent if numerous changes are made to the fixed-price 
contract (since each change creates an additional transaction). As previously stated, 
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weapons programs are often initiated with incomplete information, and there are 
generally many changes driven by evolving technology and requirements. 
And, because contractors may “bid low to win,” the winning contractor has a perverse 
incentive to maximize the number of changes by, perhaps, suggesting a technology 
change that could improve performance, thus increasing the number of transaction costs 
for the fixed-price contract.  
Incomplete Contract Theory 
Creating a contract that is truly comprehensive is unrealistic; that is, few contracts can 
precisely define each party’s obligations in all potential scenarios that may arise. Even 
when it is possible to do so, the transaction costs involved often make it impractical. 
Thus, instead of writing comprehensive contracts, parties often negotiate an incomplete 
contract, leaving some ambiguity in its provisions. As a result, the incomplete contract 
may contain contractual obligations that are observable to the parties involved “but not 
verifiable ex post by third parties, [such as] a judge or an arbitrator to whom parties might 
eventually refer when controversies arise” (Nicita & Pagano, 2005, p. 145). In this 
situation, the parties involved may exploit the ambiguities in the contract to their 
advantage. This possibility is of particular relevance with regard to defense programs that 
entail the development of highly specific assets. For instance, contractors may 
underinvest in asset specificity so that the product, or components of the product, might 
be “redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users” at some point in the future 
(Nicita & Pagano, 2005, p. 146). However, the contractor also faces a risk. For instance, 
the DoD could claim, based on its interpretation of the contract, that a product does not 
meet the specified requirements, thereby nullifying the contract. Depending on the level 
of asset specificity, the contractor may be unable to put its investments to productive use. 
The DoD, for its part, makes significant investments in contractor-performed research 
and development. Over time, the DoD may become dependent on a firm, especially if it is 
the sole provider of a certain technology. Even over the life of a single contract, the DoD 
may develop a dependency on a particular firm for a critical defense capability. In this 
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situation, there is a risk that the contractor will seek to renegotiate the contract, perhaps in 
order to increase its profits by exploiting ambiguities in the contract. The DoD may have 
little recourse, especially if it has already invested heavily with the contractor.  
Broadly speaking, then, incomplete contract theory generally does not support the use of 
fixed-price contracts for weapons system development programs. Because initial 
performance requirements are often unstable, the ambiguity in the contract may enable 
the contractor to technically meet a requirement according to the letter of the contract (or 
its interpretation of the contract) but fail to meet its intent as envisioned by the DoD. 
Thus, because the contractor does not necessarily hold the same interests as its customer, 
programs may fail to meet DoD expectations.  
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IV. Fixed-Price Contracting in Practice 
 
In this section, we examine three DoD aircraft acquisitions that relied on fixed-price 
contracts: the C-5 Galaxy, the F-111 Aardvark, and the A-12 Avenger II. These examples 
were chosen to highlight the various risks associated with fixed-price contracting. We 
then provide a brief overview of the F-117 Nighthawk program, which used a cost-
reimbursement contract during the development phase, in order to illustrate the positive 
outcomes that were obtained. 
The C-5 Galaxy  
Conceived in the early 1960s to 
augment the U.S military’s airlift 
capability, the C-5 Galaxy (“C-5”) is 
among the largest military aircraft ever 
produced. The C-5 has been used in 
virtually every U.S. conflict from 
Vietnam to Iraq. Today’s updated C-5s 
can carry more than 920,000 pounds of 
equipment (which could include up to 
six Boeing AH-64 Apaches or 
five Bradley Fighting Vehicles; see Table 2). Griffin (2004) notes that the C-5 “still 
accomplishes tasks that no other military aircraft, such as the new C-17 or any derivative 
of commercial cargo aircraft, can perform and has consistently carried more cargo than 
any other aircraft in the time of war” (p. vi).  
The C-5 has a number of unique features. For example, the nose swings open on hinges 
so that in addition to an aft ramp, a front ramp can be extended for easy loading and 
unloading of equipment. Another innovation is an automated built-in test capability that 
“electronically monitors 600 test points, locates any troubles, and prints out repair 
instructions” (Shults, 1976, p. 4). The initial aircraft specifications, however, also called 
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for a number of innovative features that in retrospect were a clear case of over-
specification by the Air Force, commonly referred to as gold-plating. For example, 
included in the original requirements document was the requirement for an in-flight 
airdrop capability—the design would have to be able to airdrop single loads of up to 
50,000 pounds from the rear cargo bay. There was also a requirement for advanced 
avionics that would allow the C-5 crews to identify drop zones and conduct airdrop 
operations at night or in poor weather.  Further, there was a requirement for a terrain- 
following radar so that the C-5 could fly at low altitudes to evade detection by the enemy 
(Shults, 1976).  Additionally, there was a requirement for the C-5 to be capable of 
landing on short, unimproved runways.  Early criticism surrounding the inclusion of these 
features—many believed that they would never actually be used—was, for the most part, 
initially overlooked. As it turned out, including these capabilities proved technically 
challenging and, ultimately, very costly to develop.  
 
Weight Capability 
Design Weight 764,000 pounds (1) 
840,000 pounds (2) 
920,000 pounds (3) 
Max payload 265,000 pounds (4) 
Max fuel 335,000 pounds 
Max landing weight 635,850 pounds 
Performance Capability 





8,000 feet at maximum gross weight 
4,000 feet with 100,000 pounds cargo 
(1) at 2.25 g 
(2) with new wings (1980-1987) 
(3) in flight limit after refueling 
(4) with new wings (1980-1987) 
 
Table 2.  C-5A Performance Characteristics  
(Launius & Dvorscak, 2001) 
 
In an effort to incentivize contractors to minimize program costs, Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara introduced TPP in the mid-1960s to acquire the C-5. As its name 
suggests, TPP incorporates into a single contract all development and production (and, 
often, support) costs. In addition, the contract would include precise price and 
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performance expectations. The C-5 contract was negotiated, using this strategy, with a 
fixed-price incentive contract (Shults, 1976). Under this type of contract, contractors 
could receive increased profits if the price came in below the agreed-upon initial 
estimate. Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Installations and Logistics Robert 
Charles justified its use, asserting that 
a fixed-price incentive contract is the most feasible type of award to be issued under the 
total package procurement plan. A straight fixed-price contract may apply to some areas 
where nothing more than routine engineering and production are involved, but where 
you’re dealing with a system that hasn’t been designed or developed when the contract is 
signed, the fixed-price incentive contract is best. Otherwise, you may be threatening 
corporate financial catastrophe, and that’s the last thing we want.  (“C-5A Pioneers in 
Subcontract Relations,” 1967, p. 251) 
However, there is little difference between a firm-fixed-price and fixed-price incentive 
contract when it comes to averting “corporate financial catastrophe.” Under either 
arrangement, the contractor has little to no recourse should costs exceed the agreed-upon 
ceiling price. This would become painfully clear as the C-5 program progressed. 
In December 1964, the DoD initiated the C-5A program and issued a request for proposal 
(see Table 3) Four months later, in April 1965, three firms submitted their bids for the 10-
year, 115-airplane contract: Boeing, Douglas, and Lockheed. Boeing’s bid was the 
highest at $2.2 billion, followed by Douglas’s at $2 billion (Shults, 1976). Lockheed 
submitted the lowest bid at $1.9 billion. Lockheed’s low bid was unsurprising given its 
financial position at the time. Unlike its two competitors, whose DoD contracts were 
balanced by commercial sales, Lockheed’s business was almost completely dependent on 
the DoD (Shults, 1976). Moreover, Lockheed was in the final stage of its C-141 contract 
with the Air Force, and there were few other defense contracts on the horizon. However, 
there was speculation that the Air Force was interested in acquiring a supersonic transport 
aircraft at some point in the near future. In order to keep its production facilities operating 
and its manpower intact, Lockheed executives believed that securing the C-5 contract 





Concept Exploration 1957–1963 
  Mission Effectiveness/Operational Analysis 1957–1963 
  Contractor Teams Assembled 1961–1963 
  Total Package Procurement C Evolution 1963–1965 
  AF System Program Office Cadre Established 1964 
Systems Design and Development 1964–1972 
  Contractor Conceptual Design Trades 1961–1964 
  RFP Release  Dec 1964 
  Contractor submits proposal 20 April 1965 
  Contractor Proposal Evaluation by AF April 1965–Sept 1965 
  Contractor Initial Debriefs Sept 1965 
  Lockheed Announced as C-5 Winner Sept 1965 
  Weight Growth/Drag Increase Dec 1965–Jan 1967 
  System Program Office Cure Notice Feb 1967 
  First SPO IRT 1967 
  First Fatigue Test Results June 1968–Dec 1972 
  First Flight 28 June 1968 
  Defense Advisory Group 1969 
  ASC IRT 1969–1971 
  Flight Restrictions on C-5A 1969–1987 
Production of C-5A 1967–1973 
  Last (81st) C-5A Delivered May 1973 
Initial Operational Capability June 1970 
New Wing Design Start Jan 1976 
First C-5A Wing Modification June 1981 
First C-5B Delivered Sept 1985 
Last C-5A Wing Modification May 1987 
 
Table 3.  C-5 Timetable  
(Griffin, 2004) 
 
After a thorough evaluation, the Air Force’s Source Selection Board chose Boeing, 
primarily based on the superiority of its design. However, top Air Force officials 
overruled the decision and chose Lockheed, contending that its bid represented 
significant savings to the government. General Electric and Pratt & Whitney were 
contracted by the Air Force to develop and manufacture the engines; however, Lockheed 
(having agreed to the engine specifications) was responsible for the delivery of the 
completed aircraft.  
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Lockheed’s target cost for producing 115 C-5A airframes was $1.7686 billion. As 
stipulated by the contract, the Air Force was to pay Lockheed the target cost plus 10% 
profit ($177 million). Thus, the target price of the C-5A acquisition was set at $1.9453 
billion (Shults, 1976).  The Air Force also established a ceiling price of $2.2991 billion 
(130% of Lockheed’s target cost). The Air Force recognized that Lockheed had assumed 
significant risk: responsibility over other contractors, the 10-year duration of the contract, 
and the unprecedented nature of the program—not to mention the low bid. These factors 
made it very difficult to envision all of the challenges that would arise, let alone meet 
them.  
In an effort to reduce the financial risk to Lockheed, a number of clauses were built into 
the contract. For instance, the contract stipulated that Lockheed would pay only 30% of 
costs incurred that were over the target but below the ceiling price. However, in the event 
that costs exceeded the ceiling price, Lockheed would be solely responsible for covering 
them. On the other hand, as a fixed-price-incentive contract, if the total cost came in 
under the target price, Lockheed would be entitled to 50% of the savings. In addition, 
incentives were written into the contract to reward Lockheed for exceeding performance 
goals established by the Air Force. However, the failure to meet performance goals was 
not reflected in the form of penalties (as is often the case when contracting for large 
projects); rather, such failure would be viewed as a design deficiency that the contractor 
would be required to correct.  
Delivery of the 115 aircraft was divided into two phases. The Air Force placed an initial 
order for 58 aircraft under the terms described in the initial contract. Upon their 
successful delivery, the Air Force would order the remaining 57, using a pricing formula 
that reflected the total cost of the first order. For instance, in the event that the cost of the 
first order exceeded the ceiling price by an amount up to 140.5% of the target cost, the 
percentage difference between the ceiling price and 140.5% would be multiplied by 1.5 
(Shults, 1976). The target cost of the second order would be increased by the resulting 
percentage. If the total cost exceeded the ceiling price by more than 140.5%, this factor 
would be increased from 1.5 to 2. Some have argued that this clause, in particular, acted 
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as a perverse incentive. If costs of the first order began to increase for whatever reason, 
Lockheed might be incentivized to continue to incur costs up to just over 140.5%, at 
which point the second order of aircraft would be re-priced, thereby reducing the 
contractor’s overall cost burden by significantly increasing the price of the second 
contract. 
In 1968, the Air Force projected that the program might exceed initial estimates by more 
than $2 billion, of which approximately $1.06 billion was attributable to Lockheed (see 
Table 4). The remainder of the overrun was attributed to General Electric for increases in 
the cost of its engines and to the Air Force for logistics-related cost increases. Lockheed’s 
overruns stemmed primarily from its efforts to correct design deficiencies that were 
discovered during the initial testing. For example, stress tests produced small cracks in 
the wing spars. The contract required that the C-5 withstand stresses of up to 150% of 
limit load. The cracks appeared under stresses of 128% of limit load. To solve the 
problem, Lockheed replaced the titanium fasteners with ones made of titanium, steel, and 
aluminum. This added approximately $185,000 and 250 lbs. to each aircraft, but the 
problem was only partially solved. As a result, the C-5 could only carry 80% of the 
required payload. In addition, based on this design change, the aircraft’s life expectancy 
was reduced from 30,000 hours to 20,000 hours (Shults, 1976).    
 
 Target Cost 
Contract Award 






Engineering $286,542 $416,242 $129,700 
Tooling $158,908 $236,372 $77,464 
Production $509,527 $1,121,967 $612,550 
Subcontracts $245,527 $424,948 $179,421 
Quality Assurance $30,282 $54,447 $24,165 
Other $47,927 $81,516 $33,589 
Total $1,278,603 $2,335,492 $1,056,889 
 
 





Many other problems were discovered throughout the testing process. For instance, the 
wing surface had to be enlarged to reduce drag. This was a relatively cheap fix, but as a 
result of the modification, the aircraft exceeded the contractual weight limit. The design 
of the engine mounts was also inadequate, as vividly demonstrated in 1971 when an 
engine fell off the aircraft during take-off. Other deficiencies included the landing gear, 
which was designed to “kneel” to facilitate rapid loading and unloading. The process took 
12 minutes; however, the contract specified that it take no longer than three minutes. In 
addition, the terrain-following radar never worked properly; the aircraft was never able to 
land on unimproved runways (early attempts caused severe damage to the engines); and 
the cargo door could not be opened during flight, which meant that the airdrop 
requirement, discussed previously, could not be met. Other factors, although minor in 
comparison, led to additional increases. For instance, Lockheed underestimated the labor 
and material costs, which rose steadily during the early years of the program. In addition, 
Lockheed implemented a new management structure, requiring that all program areas 
report their problems to the directorate level. This structure, it was believed, led to further 
inefficiencies and cost increases.  
Indeed, many of the so-called deficiencies could be better described as “under 
capabilities.”  This is not to say that there were not serious design problems, especially 
with regard to the wings, but that certain features (e.g. the special landing gear, airdrop 
capability, and terrain-following radar) could have been forfeited early on to the benefit 
of all parties involved, especially since these features were seen by many as nice-to-have, 
not need-to-have features. But under TPP, Lockheed was contractually obligated to fulfill 
all performance requirements. As a result, Lockheed spent an inordinate amount of time, 
effort, and money engaged in futile efforts to correct deficiencies—time and money that 
could have been saved had there been the ability to more easily negotiate performance 
trade-offs. In 1968, for instance, Lockheed asked the Air Force to relax the aircraft 
weight ceiling (Shults, 1976). The Air Force denied the request. Lockheed then proposed 
a trade-off: relaxing the weight ceiling in exchange for increased thrust. The Air Force 
refused this proposal as well. The Air Force maintained that because the contractor 
signed the initial contract, it had to meet all requirements without exception or 
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modification. As a result, Lockheed had to use uncommon materials to reduce the weight, 
which led to spiraling costs. 
There is some indication that the Air Force may have attempted to conceal the overruns 
from Congress. For instance, in early 1967, when the program office was first made 
aware of aircraft deficiencies, it issued a “cure notice,” which notified Lockheed that 
unless the deficiencies were resolved, the contract would be terminated. The Air Force 
later rescinded the notice but launched an internal investigation into the nature of the 
deficiencies as well as their cost implications. The findings were never made public. 
Moreover, when the Air Force’s investigation revealed a projected $2 billion overrun, the 
Air Force failed to immediately inform Congress. A debate ensued over whether the Air 
Force failed to follow the required notification procedures. The Air Force, for its part, 
contended that it was not obligated to disclose cost estimates between official 
congressional testimonies. 
In late 1968, the Air Force realized that Lockheed was on the verge of bankruptcy. In 
1969, realizing that it would have little recourse should Lockheed’s situation worsen, the 
Air Force took delivery of the first C-5A, leaving many of the acknowledged deficiencies 
unresolved. In fact, it was not until 1987 that all of the C-5As received new wings, 
allowing the aircraft to carry the initially-required maximum payload. Even after the Air 
Force signed off on the initial order, it was unclear if Lockheed would be able to sustain 
its operations. However, after several rounds of negotiation, the Air Force decided that it 
would pursue the acquisition of the remaining 57 aircraft under the conditions of the 
original contract. But because Lockheed exceeded the 140% threshold discussed 
previously, the second order was re-priced. However, this course of action was short-
lived. Later that same year, the Air Force reduced its second order from 57 to 23 (for a 
total of 81 aircraft) on account of the aircraft’s increased price, suboptimal performance, 
and other budgetary pressures (Shults, 1976).    
As a result, Lockheed’s financial position worsened considerably, prompting the firm to 
seek assistance from the government. In 1971, the Air Force replaced the existing 
contract with a cost-minus-fixed-fee contract, under the condition that Lockheed absorb a 
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$200 million loss, which was more than half of the firm’s net worth. Lockheed agreed, 
production resumed, and the 81st C-5A was delivered in 1973. The Nixon administration 
later provided  a $250 million federal loan to Lockheed in order to  preserve Lockheed’s 
defense production capacity and protect the more than 25,000 jobs that would be lost if 
Lockheed were to declare bankruptcy. The Air Force, for its part, acknowledged that TPP 
was a flawed approach and that it would return to more traditional strategies. 
The F-111 Aardvark 
The F-111 Aardvark (“F-111”) was a 
multipurpose tactical fighter-bomber 
capable of supersonic speeds. A unique 
feature of the F-111 was its variable 
sweep-wing, which pivoted back for high-
speed flight and pivoted forward for a 
short takeoff and landing. Another unique 
feature was the crew compartment, which, 
in the event of an emergency, would serve 
as an escape module for the two-man 
crew.4 Despite its controversial origins and 
costly procurement, the F-111 turned out to be one of the most effective all-weather 
interdiction aircraft ever built. At the time, no other aircraft in the Air Force could carry 
out the F-111’s mission, which included precise, long-distance air strikes in all-weather 
conditions.  
The history of the F-111 program dates back to the late 1950s. The Air Force was 
considering replacing a number of its ageing fighters (the F-100, F-101, and F-105). At 
the same time, the Navy was assessing its options for a two-seat, carrier-based, fleet air 
defense fighter to replace its F-4 and F-8. Although their needs differed considerably, 
                                     
 




Secretary McNamara insisted that the Navy and Air Force work together to develop joint 
requirements to the extent possible. In February 1961, Secretary McNamara directed the 
development of a single aircraft that would satisfy both the Air Force’s and Navy’s 
requirements, believing that this strategy would substantially reduce acquisition costs. 
The project was known as the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX; see Figure 2). 
Armament: One 20mm M61A1 gun, plus a mix of up to 24 conventional or nuclear 
weapons  
Engines: Two Pratt & Whitney TF30-P-3 of 18,500 lbs. thrust each  
(with afterburner)  
Maximum speed: 1,452 mph  
Cruising speed: 685 mph  
Range: 3,632 miles  
Service ceiling: 57,000 ft.  
Span: 32 ft. swept; 63 ft. extended  
Length: 73 ft. 6 in.  
Height: 17 ft.  
Weight: 92,657 lbs. maximum  
Crew: Two 
 
Figure 2.  F-111A Technical Specifications 
(GAO, 1973) 
 
In September 1961, the DoD issued an RFP. The Air Force version of the TFX was 
designated as F-111A, the Navy version as F-111B. Rather than producing actual 
hardware, competing contractors built models that were then subjected to wind tunnel 
testing. The GAO (1970) asserted that this resulted in a “paper competition,” with 
contractors submitting unrealistic cost estimates. Indeed, cost growth occurred shortly 
after the contractor was chosen. More problematic still, the DoD pursued concurrent 
development and production of the F-111. In other words, the DoD guaranteed that the 
selected contractor would be paid to both develop and produce the aircraft, which, it has 
been argued, served as a disincentive to efficient development.  
Boeing and General Dynamics were invited to participate in the final competition in 
September 1962. Both the Air Force and the Navy preferred Boeing’s designs. However, 
in November 1962, the Office of the Secretary of Defense selected the General Dynamics 
design, believing it would lead to a greater degree of commonality between the Air Force 
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and the Navy variants and, thus, to lower costs (Boeing’s two versions shared less than 
half of the major structural components). According to the two designs, the F-111A and 
F-111B would share the same primary structure, the same fuel system, the same pair of 
turbofans, and the same two-seat cockpit.  
An initial fixed-price-incentive-contract was awarded to General Dynamics. The R&D 
contract was approved in 1964, with a target price of $480.4 million, and included the 
production of 23 test aircrafts (18 Air Force and 5 Navy). Three production contracts 
were issued over the course of six years, beginning in 1965. The initial target price for 
production of all 1,196 F-111s was estimated at $2.067 billion. Despite Secretary 
McNamara’s proclamation that the development and production of a common aircraft 
would save as much as a billion dollars, costs increased dramatically over the duration of 
the program. By 1972, the development cost estimate more than tripled, to $1.675 billion, 
while the production estimate increased by more than $3 billion, to $5.334 billion. Note, 
however, that these figures did not take into account the cost of the government-furnished 
engines, which were built by Pratt & Whitney.  
The early development of the F-111 proved problematic and costly.  Problems included 
inlet-engine compatibility, structural failures in the wing carry-through structure, and the 
introduction of a technically immature digital avionics system. The effort expended to 
develop and produce the aircraft based on firm requirements, many of which were 
unrealistic, led to pronounced variances between original requirements and the actual 
performance. The Air Force attributed these variances to higher than anticipated fuel 
consumption, aerodynamic drag, and increased weight. Early testing uncovered the 
following variances: 
 a decrease of 86% in the specified “dash” distance at supersonic speed, 
 a decrease of 34% in specified ferry range, 
 an increase of 37% in takeoff distance, and 
 an improvement of 42% in navigational accuracy (GAO, 1970). 
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In 1963, the Air Force estimated the unit cost of the F-111A to be $3.97 million, but by 












Development Cost 863 1630.1 1,628.5 1,641.5 1,641.5 
Procurement/Construction 
Cost 
4,642.5 5,771.2 4,751.9 5,026.4 5,353.1 
Additional Procurement 
Cost 
  960.3 903.4 511.4 
Total Dollars 5,505.5 7,401.3 7,341.1 7,571.3 7,506 
Program Unit Cost 3.97 12.52 14.05 15.09 15.01 
Quantity 1,388 591 454 442 466 
 
Table 5.  Changes in Cost of F-111 (In Millions of Dollars) 
(GAO, 1973) 
 
According to the GAO (1970), the increases in unit cost can be attributed to the following 
factors: 
 a decrease in the number of aircraft to be produced, 
 an increase in the number of aircraft versions (including those later abandoned), 
 weapons systems capability improvements, 
 inflation, and 
 technical problems.  
 More generally, the joint effort proved problematic. According to Elmer Staats, 
the comptroller general at the time, “Program costs were undoubtedly increased 
by the effort to procure an aircraft with a high degree of commonality to serve the 
needs of both the Air Force and the Navy” (Statement by Elmer B. Staats, 1971, p. 
3).  According to the Federation of American Scientists, “this was impossible to 
achieve, especially since planners placed priority upon the Air Force requirement, 
and then tried to tailor this heavy landplane to the constraints of carrier-based 
naval operations” (2011, p. 1) Staats notes, for example, that the Navy was 
concerned about the increase in the aircraft’s weight, a concern that was not 
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shared by the Air Force. Efforts to resolve the differences in opinion and settle on 
a weight limit clearly delayed production of the aircraft. Indeed, the program 
experienced many significant schedule slippages. The initial delivery schedule 
incorporated into the definitized production contract showed that a total of 449 
aircrafts were to be delivered by December 31, 1969, but as of that date, only 207 
had been delivered. Other schedule changes included the following: 
 The start of Category I flight tests for the F-111D slipped 14 months. 
 The start of Category II flight tests for the F-111D were expected to slip 20 
months. 
 The delivery of the first production of the MARK II avionics system for the F-
111D was expected to slip 20 months. (GAO, 1970). 
The first flight of the F-111A took place in December 1964, and the first production 
models were delivered to the Air Force in 1967. Meanwhile, the F-111B program was 
canceled because it was not meeting the Navy’s expectations. According to the Navy, of 
the $335 million it spent, $115 million was considered a “lost cost” (Staats, 1971). 
Production ended in 1976. In all, 562 F-111s of all series were built, 159 of which were 
preproduction and production F-111As. The Air Force aircraft was later produced in a 
variety of models, including the F-111A, F-111D, F-111E, and F-111F, as well as the 
FB-111A strategic bomber. 
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The A-12 Avenger II 
The 1980s introduced the age of stealth.  
During this time period, the Air Force 
deployed the F-117 stealth fighter and was 
developing the B-2 stealth bomber. The 
Navy believed that it also needed to take 
advantage of the emerging technology. The 
result was the A-12 Avenger II (“A-12”), 
an all-weather, carrier-based stealth 
bomber that would replace the Grumman 
A-6 Intruder. 
The Navy began its Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) program in 1983 (see Figure 3). 
One of the program’s objectives was to incorporate advanced stealth technology into the 
development of medium-attack aircraft with long ranges, high payloads, and a very low 
visibility profile. Another objective was to design an aircraft that could remain 






Length: 37 ft. 10 in 
Wingspan Unfolded: 70 ft. 
3 in 
Folded: 36 ft. 3 in 
Height: 11 ft. 3 in 
Wing area: 1,308 ft² 
Empty weight: 39,000 lb. 
Loaded weight: 80,000 lb. 




turbofans, 13,000 lbf. each 
Performance 
Maximum speed: 580 mph 
Range: 920 mi 
Service ceiling: 40,000 ft. 
Rate of climb: 5000 ft./min 
Wing loading: 61 lb./ft² 
Thrust/weight: 0.325 
 




On January 13, 1988, a team consisting of General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas 
was awarded a full-scale development contract. The contract was a fixed-price-incentive-
contract with a target price of $4.38 billion, a ceiling price of $4.784 billion, and a 60/40 
share ratio between target and ceiling with an economic price adjustment (to account for 
inflation). In an effort to reduce the financial risk to the contractor team, the contract 
stipulated that the Navy would pay 60% of costs incurred that were over the target cost 
but below the ceiling price. The target price included $3.98 billion in costs, with a 
possible profit of $398 million (10% of the target price). The contractor agreed to 
develop and deliver eight fight-test aircraft and five full-scale ground test articles (DoD, 
1991). The Navy initially planned to buy 620 A-12s, and the Marine Corps planned to 
purchase an additional 238 planes. The Air Force also considered buying 400 A-12s to 




From the beginning, the development process was troubled by a series of significant 
technical and engineering problems. First, there were several conflicts in conceptual 
design. The Navy wanted the A-12 to be a carrier-based “superplane” that could survive 
the rigors of carrier landing at sea and also evade radars. These two requirements were in 
conflict, given the technology level at that time: the harsh landing, ocean spray, and sun 
damaged the plane's finish, making it less able to evade radars (GAO, 1991b).  
Second, the extensive use of composites in the A-12 structure, to minimize stress, led to 
technical difficulties with the structure and increased costs. These composites exceeded 
the anticipated weight. As a result, heavier metal components had to be used for some 
structural elements. Thus, the final weight of each aircraft exceeded 30 tons and was 
between 10% and 30% over design specification (Mahnken, 2008). This was a serious 
concern for carrier-based operations. Unfortunately, the McDonnell Douglas and General 
Dynamics team had limited experience in building large structures using composites. To 
solve this problem, the team had to develop this technology concurrently with the full-
scale development of the aircraft. 
Third, the contractor experienced technical difficulties developing the aircraft’s complex 
radar system (the Synthetic Aperture Radar System), which caused several delays. 
Despite these technical difficulties, both the Navy and the contractor team were very 
optimistic about the schedule and cost of the A-12 program. On December 19, 1989, 
Secretary Cheney initiated a major aircraft review (MAR) to review four major aircraft 
programs, including the A-12. On April 26, 1990, Cheney, testifying before the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committees on the results of the MAR, confirmed the 
necessity of the A-12 development and the continuity of development efforts. He 
announced that the project was very likely to succeed under the current contract—the 
first A-12 would be delivered in early 1991, and the entire program would be finished 
within the original cost estimation.    
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However, in the early 1990s, as the development process evolved, McDonnell Douglas 
and General Dynamics revealed projected delays and cost increases. They admitted that 
the project faced serious engineering problems and some performance expectations could 
not be met. In response, the Navy agreed to postpone the first flight to December 1991. 
This new delivery schedule was established using a no-cost contract modification, with 
no increase in the ceiling price (U.S. Congress, 1992). 
On July 9, 1990, the Secretary of the Navy conducted an administrative inquiry to 
investigate the problems associated with the A-12 development, with the focus on “the 
cause if the variance, accountability, and any systemic or other changes or improvements 
needed to ensure that significant information is developed and made available to 
appropriate officials in a timely, accurate manner” (Beach, 1990, p. 1) The results of the 
administrative inquiry, referred to as the Beach Report, concluded that the contractor 
team had limited experience building large composite structures and that the “projections 
of completion at or within ceiling were unrealistic, and not supported by the facts.”  It 
also indicated that the program manager in the Navy had “erred in judgment by failing to 
anticipate substantial additional cost increases beyond the ceiling … [and] greater risk to 
schedule” (Beach, 1990, p. 1). The inquiry concluded that the government and the 
contractor lacked the objectivity needed to properly assess program progress (Beach, 
1990). 
In August 1990, the contractor team requested the adaptation of flexible progress 
payments with a reimbursement rate of 97%, instead of the normal rate of 80%. Later, in 
October 1990, the Navy declined this request, arguing that the contactors failed to 
provide sufficient information to support the change. On November 12, 1990, the 
contractor team put forward an uncertified claim for equitable adjustment, asking for an 
increase of $1.47 billion over the previous target price, based on the delays and disruption 
experienced. 
Secretary Cheney directed the Navy secretary “to show cause” as to why the DoD should 
not terminate the program (CRS, 1991). The Navy, in turn, required that the contractors 
respond to Cheney’s demand and notified them that the contract might be terminated 
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unless satisfactory conditions were obtained by January 2, 1991. The contractor team 
submitted a new certified program claim, requesting a $1.4 billion increase in the target 
price. But on January 2, 1991, the contractor team replied that they could not meet the 
technical specifications and deliver the aircrafts in time.  
On January 7, 1991, Secretary Cheney directed the Navy to terminate the A-12 program 
for default. The Navy believed that McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics were not 
able to complete the design, development, and delivery of the A-12 while meeting the 
performance requirements within the schedule. Prior to the program’s termination, the 
Navy had already paid the contractors $2.68 billion, but only a portion of that amount 
was for the items actually received (six design review products). Cheney issued the 
following statement: 
The A-12 I did terminate. It was not an easy decision to make because it's an important 
requirement that we're trying to fulfill. But no one could tell me how much the program 
was going to cost, even just through the full scale development phase, or when it would 
be available. And data that had been presented at one point a few months ago turned out 
to be invalid and inaccurate. (“Lifting the Veil of Military Secrecy,” 1994)  
 
It appears that the Navy never had an exact estimation of the real cost to complete the 
necessary research and development. In December 1990, the A-12 aircraft program office 
estimated the contract to cost $7.5 billion, plus an additional $0.9 billion for in-house 
work (DoD, 1991). However, the technical challenges were never taken into account in 
the formal cost estimation process. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) at the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense estimated the range of costs based on the percentage 
of completion of the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) phase of the 
program and the date of the first flight (see Table 6). The CAIG admitted that these 
estimations, although reasonable, were subject to changes, given that it had no technical 






Date of Flight  Percent of RDT&E Complete at 1st Flight 
 40 50 60 
June 1992 $14,280 $11,424 $9,520 
December 1992 156,865 12,692 10,577 
March 1993 17,355 13,884 11,570 
 
Table 6.  A-12 Full-Scale Development Costs (In Millions of Dollars, Including Government Costs)  
(DoD, 1991) 
 
In February 1991, the Navy required McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamics to repay 
$1.35 billion in progress payments. The contractor team believed that the manner in 
which the program was canceled was inappropriate and filed a lawsuit in U.S. Claims 
Court. It argued that the Navy breached the contract and that the termination was for the 
convenience of the government rather than for default.  
This led to years of litigation between the contractors and the DoD over breach of 
contract. On June 1, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the 
U.S. Navy was justified in canceling the contract and that the two contractors should 
repay more than $1.35 billion, plus interest charges of $1.45 billion. However, the 
contractors vowed to appeal the decision. In September 2010, the Supreme Court 
declared that the government canceled the project in an improper manner and that the use 
of a state secrets claim by the U.S. government prevented the contractors from mounting 
an effective defense. More recently, in May 2011, the Supreme Court decision set aside 
the Appeals Court decision and sent it back to federal circuit court. The cancellation of 
the A-12 program was considered a major loss for McDonnell Douglas, which led to its 











In the 1970s, the Air Force 
expressed a desire to integrate 
stealth technology into its aircraft 
to enable the attack of enemy 
targets using the low-observable, 
radar-evading qualities. This led 
to the design and development of 
the F-117 Nighthawk (“F-117”), 
the first operational aircraft 
initially designed around stealth 
technology. The F-117 aircraft 
could penetrate enemy airspace without being detected. Thus, it brought new and 
impressive combat capabilities to the battlefield (see Figure 4). 
 
The F-117 was developed within a Special Access Program; access to the program was 
strictly limited. It conducted its first flight on June 18, 1981, and achieved initial 
operating capability status in October 1983. However, only in November 1988 did the 
DoD acknowledge the existence of the F-117. The aircraft retired from the Air Force on 
April 22, 2008. By that time, a total of 64 F-117s had been produced, with five for testing 
and 59 for operational use. 
 
In most regards, the F-117 program acquisition is considered a successful program.  All 
of the key performance goals were achieved. The actual development schedule and total 
acquisition cost were comparable with those of contemporary programs. Its dramatically 
improved penetration capabilities were displayed in a broader range of operations in 







Armament: Up to 5,000 lbs. of assorted internal stores  
Engines: Two General Electric F404-F1D2 engines of 10,600 lbs. thrust each  
Crew: One  
Maximum cruise speed: 684 mph  
Range: Unlimited with aerial refueling  
Ceiling: 45,000 ft. 
Span: 43 ft. 4 in.  
Length: 65 ft. 11 in.  
Height: 12 ft. 5 in.  
Weight: 52,500 lbs. maximum 
 
 
Figure 4. Technical Specifications of the F-117 NightHawk 
(Smith, Shulman, & Leonard, 1996) 
 
The program began in 1974, when the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) initiated “Project Harvey,” a program requiring the design of an “experimental 
survivable testbed” aircraft. Lockheed’s “Hopeless Diamond” design won the 
competition in April 1976. DARPA then issued a contract to Lockheed to build two test 
aircraft under the code name “Have Blue” in order to test the design’s low observability.  
 
The Have Blue testing occurred in December 1977 (see Figure 5). The test data were 
sufficiently encouraging that the DoD urged the Air Force to use stealth technology to 
develop an operational aircraft. The final decision to produce the F-117 was made on 
November 1, 1978. On November 16, 1978, Lockheed was awarded a contract for five 
full-scale development test aircrafts under the code name “Senior Trend.”  
 
The Senior Trend aircraft was a direct outgrowth of the Have Blue prototypes, 
incorporating many changes to turn the design into an operational combat aircraft. The 
aircraft was defined as a single-seat night strike-fighter with no on-board radar but with 








Figure 5. F-117 Program Development Schedule  
(Smith, Shulman, & Leonard, 1996) 
 
 
The Air Force adopted very flexible contract forms throughout the whole acquisition 
process. Table 7 provides an overview of the major contract structure. The initial 
development work, from the start of the program to the end of the formal engineering and 
manufacturing development (EMD) phase, was performed under a cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contract. This contract design gave both the Air Force and the contractor considerable 
flexibility in resolving problems identified during this phase. As is the case in many other 
development programs, even after the end of formal EMD, changes in the program were 
still necessary in order to achieve the desired capability and supportability. Further 
development work, which included a follow-on development program, was initiated 
under a fixed-price-incentive contract. 
 
Production of operational aircraft was conducted in 10 lots. The first five lots, a total of 
28 aircraft, were procured using FPI contracts, with each lot completed at a value close to 







Stage Contract Type Years Covered by Major 
Expenditures 
Initial Development Cost-plus-fixed-fee 1979–1983 
Follow-on Development Fixed-price incentive 1984–1990 
Configuration Upgrades Mixed 1984–1990 
First 28 Production Units Fixed-price incentive 1980–1984 
Next 31 Production Units Firm-fixed-price 1984–1989 
 
Table 7. F-117 Contract Structure 
(Smith, Shulman, & Leonard, 1996) 
 
 
Program security restricted the number of officials involved in program oversight and 
limited the distribution of program documentation—in effect, streamlining the acquisition 
process. The system specifications were expressed in the form of contract goals, rather 
than hard requirements. Only three parameters were strictly required to meet minimum 
requirements: mission profile, ordnance loads, and takeoff and landing distance. This 
allowed program managers the flexibility of tailoring design decisions to overall program 
goals, rather than having to satisfy a large number of detailed performance specifications. 
Moreover, after the start of program development, no major changes were made in 
program performance requirements or other specifications (except for the change in total 
quantity). As a result, there was less need for system redesign and program restructuring, 
curbing cost growth. 
 
Further, the strong and sustained support from the senior officials in the system program 
office (SPO) helped make the F-117 development progress smoothly. Mutual respect and 
good communications between the Air Force managers and the industry managers 
prompted resolution of issues. Trust in addition to tolerance for risks and uncertainty in 
program outcomes also guaranteed program stability.  
 
Table 8 compares the actual costs of the program with the estimated costs. The actual F-
117 development phase was somewhat less expensive than the estimation, and the 






 Actual Costs Estimated Costs 
Total $7,700 $7,900 












Note. EMD cost includes the cost of five flight test aircrafts. Production cost covers 
costs of the next 59 aircrafts produced. 
 
 
Table 8. Actual Costs Compared With Estimated Costs (In Millions of 1993 Dollars) 





V. The Way Forward 
In its effort to control cost growth, the DoD periodically embraces fixed-price contracts 
in order to shift more of the responsibility and risk to the contractor.  However, based on 
the theoretical considerations and the examples presented in this report, we believe that 
fixed-price contracts are not well-suited to major development programs. Contrary to 
popular belief, the use of fixed-price contracts during system development may not 
eliminate, or even reduce, cost overruns; in fact, they can exacerbate them, especially 
when the technologies involved are immature or untested. With MDAPs, this is often the 
case; programs are characterized by technological unknowns, changing requirements, 
design instability, over-optimism, and production immaturity. This is not to say that, as a 
rule, fixed-price contracts should never be used in development programs but that their 
use will not correct, or compensate for, these systemic defense acquisition challenges. 
 
Although the fixed-price contract holds political appeal for obvious reasons, the practical 
implications cannot be ignored. Time and again, fixed-price contracts have failed to 
facilitate the development and acquisition of complex military programs. In the case of 
the C-5, program cost overruns exceeded one billion dollars for the first time in military 
history. Moreover, the aircraft failed to meet numerous performance expectations. The A-
12 program was initiated in 1984, only to be canceled seven years later after military 
leaders began to question its technical feasibility. Three decades later, the DoD continues 
to incur costs associated with the program, as litigation is still pending over the manner in 
which the program was canceled. As for the F-111, the fixed-price contract was unable to 
compensate for an ill-conceived plan to provide the Navy and Air Force with different 
versions of the same aircraft. Although intended to reduce costs, the strategy had the 
opposite effect.   
 
Although these three examples are perhaps the most instructive with regard to the risks 





 In 1991, government officials admitted that the C-17 Globemaster had exceeded 
initial cost estimates by over $3 billion dollars. Then Secretary of Defense Les 
Aspin fired the general in charge of the program. In its effort to salvage the 
program, the government decided to waive all potential financial claims against 
the contractor (McDonnell Douglas) for failure to meet contractual obligations, 
lowered the aircraft’s performance standards, and ended up paying more for fewer 
aircraft.   
 
 The V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft program incurred spectacular cost overruns. 
Initiated in the early 1980s, the original cost-reimbursement contract was later 
changed to a fixed-price incentive contract by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman 
in response to congressional pressure to control the costs of MDAPs. The 
contractor team, Bell-Boeing, felt that it had little choice but to accept the terms 
of the new contract because it had already made considerable investments. In 
1986, the projected cost of the program was approximately $37 billion (in 2009 
dollars) for 1,000 aircraft. By 2009, the cost had increased to $47 billion for 500 
aircraft, a unit-cost increase of 48% (GAO, 2009c). Since the early days of the 
program, safety issues have been a perennial concern. Only recently, in 2005, was 
full production finally approved. 
 
 Costs associated with the fixed-price development and acquisition of the 
Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM), begun in the late 
1970s, more than doubled by 1984, from $3.4 billion for approximately 20,000 
missiles to $8.2 billion for 24,335 missiles. As a result, the contractor, Hughes 
Aircraft, had to absorb $265 million in cost overruns (GAO, 1987).  
Contractors may have an incentive to either underestimate or overestimate a program’s 
costs depending on their interests. For example, to ensure against future uncertainty, the 
contractor may put forth a high cost estimate, especially in a non-competitive 
environment. On the other hand, in order to get a foot in the door, the contractor may 
substantially underbid a contract. In either case, information asymmetry, combined with 
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the general lack of knowledge associated with MDAPs, makes it difficult for the DoD to 
accurately assess the validity of contractors’ estimates. Moreover, because of the high 
levels of internal and external uncertainty, unanticipated changes occur, which, in turn, 
lead to contract renegotiation, often with the DoD taking on increased risk and 
responsibility. In order to avoid the excessive transaction costs associated with contract 
renegotiation, the DoD should rely on cost-reimbursement contracts, which have greater 
built-in flexibility with regard to costs, schedule, and performance, allowing trade-offs to 
be made as development progresses. Of course, this contract type is associated with other 
challenges. For example, gold-plating, or a contractor’s attempt to deliver a higher grade 
product than the customer needs or wants, tends to be associated with cost-
reimbursement contracts. Of course, this problem cuts both ways. In the case of the C-5, 
the fixed-price contract included some extravagant features. Unable to meet some of the 
requirements, the contractor proposed a number of trade-offs that the Air Force, at least 
initially, refused to entertain. In these instances, one might argue that the contract actually 
constrained the development of the aircraft by shifting contractor efforts toward 
unattainable objectives.  
 
It is also important to realize that contractors may have no intention of delivering the 
product at the target price specified in a fixed-price contract (especially if it was an initial 
low bid, in order to win the contract award). This is not an indictment against contractor 
ethics but merely recognition that considerable maneuverability exists within the 
contract. Depending on its interests, a contractor may set its own target profit—one that is 
lower than the target specified in the contract. It is important to remember that the 
contractor continues to make a profit (albeit a shrinking profit) until costs exceed the 
ceiling price. Perhaps the contractor believes that securing an initial contract will lead to 
more profitable opportunities in the future (e.g., the large number of “changes” that 
typically occur after the contract is awarded), or as we saw in the case of the C-5, the 
contractor wanted to keep production facilities operating for strategic reasons. In such 
instances, incentives that are built into the contract may not matter. Even if the contract 
contains a 50/50 share ratio and low ceiling price (e.g., 115% of the target cost)—
conditions under which contractor profit drops precipitously upon exceeding the target 
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cost—there is no guarantee that this will improve contractor performance, especially if 
program requirements are technically unfeasible to begin with. In fact, when incentives to 
minimize costs are high, the contractor is more likely to insist on contract renegotiation in 
the event that unanticipated changes occur (Bajari & Tadelis, 2001). Often, the 
transaction costs associated with renegotiation erode the savings attributed to the use of 
high incentives. 
 
Despite having copies of the same contract, the envisioned target profit, cost, and final 
price may vary considerably between the two parties. In theory, the distance between a 
target price and a price ceiling acts as a buffer to keep costs within a reasonable range. 
When the contractor envisions its own targets, that buffer may shrink considerably, 
thereby increasing the likelihood that costs will exceed the ceiling price.  
 
At this moment, fixed-price contracts are being used for development efforts throughout 
the DoD. In February 2011, Boeing was awarded a fixed-price incentive contract to 
develop and build 179 new KC-46 strategic transport aircrafts at an estimated cost of 
$51.7 billion. The Air Force plans to exercise two contract options: the first for 19 initial 
production aircraft and the second for 18 mission-ready aircraft. Additional contract 
options can be exercised to allow for production of the remaining 156 aircraft through the 
year 2027 at a target rate of 15 aircraft per year. The initial contract specifies a target 
price of $4.4 billion and a ceiling price of $4.9 billion, with a 60/40 share ratio.  
 
Air Force officials believed that the KC-46 development represented a relatively low-risk 
effort to integrate mature military technologies into a well-defined commercial derivative 
aircraft. However, the GAO (2012) recently asserted that the KC-46 development is 
suffering from multiple schedule and technical risks. For example, the testing schedule is 
not executable as planned. Although based on a commercial aircraft, the military version 
requires structural modifications, a fly-by-wire refueling system, and extensive software 
integration. After one year of development, the Air Force estimated that costs have 




On the other hand, it is largely agreed that the F-117 Night Hawk, discussed in Section 
IV, was a model program. The F-117 was developed and produced on schedule and very 
close to within its budget.  The program relied on a cost-reimbursement contract for 
development and a fixed-price incentive contract for low-rate initial production. Most 
important, the program illustrated the effectiveness of firm-fixed-price contracts when 
used for full-rate production, at which point the design is stable. 
As the U.S. economy, still reeling from the recession of 2008, continues along the path to 
recovery, lawmakers are searching for ways to cut spending in order to reduce the 
country’s $16 trillion debt. The DoD, which consumes the second largest portion of 
government revenue, after entitlements, will likely see significant cuts in coming years. 
Indeed, cuts are already being made. In August 2011, Congress reached a budget deal 
that will cut $350 billion in defense spending over the next 10 years. Sequestration 
threatens $600 billion more in cuts. At the same time, the United States is struggling to 
transform and modernize its military forces—and their business systems—in order to 
enhance national security. In light of these budgetary constraints and security challenges, 
the DoD will need to rethink how it uses its dwindling resources; in simple terms, it must 
be able to do more with less. What worked in the past may not work in the coming years. 
The DoD must initiate bold reforms to bring increasing costs under control. The historic 
back and forth over contract type has not brought the DoD any closer to acquiring 
weapons more affordably.  Clearly, fixed-price contracts are not a cure-all. Rather, the 
DoD must rely more on proven acquisition practices—and less on shifting policies—in 







Acquisition of Major Defense Systems, 32 U.S.C. § 213.3 (1975). 
 
Antonio, R. (2003). The fixed-price incentive firm target contract: Not as firm as the 
name suggests. Retrieved from http://www.wifcon.com/anal/analfpif.htm 
 
Arena, M., Leonard, R., Murray, S., & Younossi, O. (2006). Historical cost growth of 
completed weapons system programs. Arlington, VA: RAND. 
 
Augustine, N. (1984). Augustine’s laws. Reston, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics 
& Astronautics.  
 
Bajari, P., & Tadelis, S. (2001). Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of 
procurement contracts. The RAND Journal of Economics, 32(3), 387–407.  
 
Beach, C., Jr. (1990, November 28). A-12 administrative inquiry [Memorandum for the 
Secretary of the Navy]. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. 
 
Boyne, W. (2002). Air warfare: An international encyclopedia (Vol. 1). Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO.  
 
C-5A pioneers in subcontract relations. (1967, November 20). Aviation Week & Space 
Technology, 243-251. 
 
Calcutt, H., Jr. (1993). Cost growth in DoD major programs: A historical perspective. 
Washington, DC: National Defense University. 
 
Congressional Research Service (CRS). (1991). A-12 Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) 
program weapons facts. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988. Public Law No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 
1329-1. 
 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), 48 C.F.R. ch. 2 (2012). 
 
Defense spending in a time of austerity. (2010, August). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/16886851 
 
Department of Defense (DoD). (1991). Review of the A-12 aircraft program (Audit 





Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57–74. 
 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and 
Economics, 26, 301–325. 
 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2012). Retrieved from 
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/html 
 
Federation of American Scientists. (2011). F-111: Overview. Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/man/uswpns/air/attack/f111.html 
 





General Accounting Office (GAO). (1969). Review of selected aspects of the C-5A 
program. Washington, DC: Author.  
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1970). Investigation into the F-111 program. 
Washington, DC: Author.  
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1973). F-111 aircraft. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1987). Missile procurement: AMRAAM cost growth 
and schedule delays (GAO-NSAID-87-78). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1991a). Naval aviation: Navy A-12 aircraft funding 
status. Washington, DC: Author.   
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (1991b). Review of the A-12 aircraft program. 
Washington, DC: Author.  
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009a). Defense acquisitions: Assessments 
of selected weapon programs (GAO-09-326SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009b). Extent of federal spending under 
cost-reimbursement contracts unclear and key controls not always used (GAO-
 09-921). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009c). V-22 Osprey aircraft: Assessments 
needed to address operational and cost concerns to define future investments 




Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2010). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected weapon programs (GAO-10-388SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2011). Defense acquisitions: Assessments of 
selected weapon programs (GAO-11-233SP). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2012). KC-46 tanker aircraft: Acquisition 
plans have good features but contain schedule risk (GAO-12-366). Washington, 
DC: Author. 
 
Griffin, J. (2004). C-5A galaxy systems engineering case study. Norfolk, VA: Center for 
Systems Engineering. 
 
Launius, R., & Dvorscak, B. (2001). The C-5 Galaxy history: Crushing setbacks, decisive 
achievements. Nashville, TN: Turner Publishing. 
 
Lifting the veil of military secrecy. (1994, February 20). America’s Defense Monitor. 
 
Logistics Management Institute. (1967). Total package procurement concepts: Synthesis 
of findings. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Mahnken, T. (2008). Technology and the American way of war. New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press. Major defense acquisition program defined, 10 U.S.C. 
§ 2430. 
 
Nicita, A., & Pagano, U. (2005). Incomplete contracts and institutions. In J. G. Backhaus 
(Ed.), The Elgar companion to law and economics (2nd ed., pp. 145–161). 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
Orszag, P. (2009, July 29). Improving government acquisition [Memorandum for the 




Ouchi, W. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
25(1), 29–141.  
 
Peck, M., & Scherer, F. (1962). The weapons acquisition process: An economic analysis. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Graduate School of Business.  
 
Richardson, D. (2001). Stealth warplanes. Osceola, WI: Zenith Imprint.   
 
Rogerson, W. (1994). Economic incentives and the defense procurement process. The 




Ross, S. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. American 
Economic Review, 63, 134–139. 
 
Shults, J. (1976). Case study: Lockheed and the C-5A. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
War College. 
 
Smith, K., Shulman, H., & Leonard, S. (1996). Application of F-117 acquisition strategy 
to other programs in the new acquisition environment. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND. 
 
Statement by Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Government 
Operations, United States Senate, on the F-111 Aircraft Program (1971). 
 
U.S. Congress. (1992). A-12 Navy aircraft system review and recommendations. 102nd 
Congress. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.  
 
Weigelt, M. (2012, July 13). Contractor distrust costs DoD billions, study says. 







This research was sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School, and we are especially 
grateful for the support and encouragement provided by Rear Admiral Jim Greene (USN, 
Ret.) and Keith Snider. Additionally, we would like to acknowledge John Rigilano, a 
CPPPE faculty research assistant, whose research and writing contributed to this report. 
Finally, we would like to thank our co-worker, Caroline Dawn Pulliam, for her assistance 
with the planning and coordination of this study. 
51 
 
About the Authors 
 
 
Jacques S. Gansler 
 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland; he 
is also the director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. As the third-
ranking civilian at the Pentagon from 1997–2001, Dr. Gansler was responsible for all 
research and development, acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, 
environmental security, defense industry, and numerous other security programs.  Before 
joining the Clinton Administration, Dr. Gansler held a variety of positions in government 
and the private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Material 
Acquisition), assistant director of defense research and engineering (electronics), senior 
vice president at TASC, vice president of ITT, and engineering and management 
positions with Singer and Raytheon Corporations. 
 
Throughout his career, Dr. Gansler has written, published, testified, and taught on 
subjects related to his work.  He is the author of five books and over 100 articles.  His 
most recent book is Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a 21st Century Defense Industry 
(MIT Press, 2011).  
 
In 2007, Dr. Gansler served as the chair of the secretary of the Army’s Commission on 
Contracting and Program Management for Army Expeditionary Forces.  He is a member 
of the Defense Science Board and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Advisory Board.  He is also a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a 
fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration.  Additionally, he is the Glenn 
L. Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering; 
an affiliate faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business; and a senior 
fellow at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (all at the University of 
Maryland).  From 2003–2004, Dr. Gansler served as interim dean of the School of Public 
52 
 
Policy at the University of Maryland, and from 2004–2006, he served as the vice 
president for research at the University of Maryland. 
 
William Lucyshyn 
William Lucyshyn is the director of research and a senior research scholar at the Center 
for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University 
of Maryland. In this position, he directs research on critical policy issues related to the 
increasingly complex problems associated with improving public-sector management and 
operations and with how government works with private enterprise. 
 
His current projects include modernizing government supply-chain management, 
identifying government sourcing and acquisition best practices, and analyzing 
Department of Defense business modernization and transformation. Previously, Mr. 
Lucyshyn served as a program manager and the principal technical advisor to the director 
of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the identification, 
selection, research, development, and prototype production of advanced technology 
projects. 
 
Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the U.S. Air Force. 
Mr. Lucyshyn received his bachelor’s degree in engineering science from the City 
University of New York and earned his master’s degree in nuclear engineering from the 




Jiahuan Lu is a doctoral candidate of public administration at the Maryland School of 
Public Policy.  His research interest focuses on public administration, government 
contracting, organization management, and performance management. He also works as a 
graduate research assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the 
School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. In this position, he conducts 










THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise provides the strategic linkage between the public and private sector to develop and 
improve solutions to increasingly complex problems associated with the delivery of public services — a responsibility increasingly shared 
by both sectors. Operating at the nexus of public and private interests, the Center researches, develops, and promotes best practices; 
develops policy recommendations; and strives to infl uence senior decision-makers toward improved government and industry results. 
The Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise is a research Center within the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy.
FORM_Online Report Cover.indd   2 9/25/2012   12:29:09 PM
